This study examines the association between hospital uncompensated care and reductions in Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments resulting from the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. We used data on California hospitals from 1996 to 2003 and employed two-stage least squares with a first-differencing model to control for potential feedback effects. Our findings suggest that nonprofit hospitals did reduce provision of uncompensated care in response to reductions in Medicaid DSH, but the response was inelastic in value. Policymakers need to continue to monitor uncompensated care as sources of support for indigent care change with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).
A growing number of individuals in the United States do not have health insurance. Census Bureau data indicate the number of uninsured increased dramatically from 31 million in 1987 to 50.7 million in 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). In the U.S. health system, the uninsured often rely on hospitals to provide charity care, or more broadly defined, uncompensated care (Bazzoli et al. 2006; Davidoff et al. 2000; Lo Sasso and Seamster 2007) . Existing studies estimated the overall amount of hospital uncompensated care costs at about $23.6 billion in 2001 (Hadley and Holahan 2003) and $35 billion in 2008 (Hadley et al. 2008) . In order to offset the burden from this type of care, hospitals rely on various types of public and private financial support from federal, state, and local governments or private philanthropy (Fishman and Bentley 1997; Hadley et al. 2005; Hadley and Holahan 2003) .
The Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) program is a major funding source for safety-net hospitals and provides funding to support free and discounted care for uninsured and Medicaid patients. The Medicaid DSH program accounted for approximately 10.2% of total Medicaid expenditures in 1997 and 4.9% in 2009. 1 The program supported about 36% of total uncompensated care costs for hospitals in 2001 and about 30% in 2008 (Hadley et al. 2005; Hadley and Holahan 2003; Hadley et al. 2008 ). In the early 1990s, Medicaid DSH payments expanded rapidly. Medicaid DSH spending grew from less than $1 billion in 1990 to more than $17 billion in 1992. To limit this dramatic growth, Congress implemented several major reforms that cap the amount of DSH spending. 2 In 1997, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) further limited Medicaid DSH payments by reducing statespecific federal allotments 3 nationally by $10.4 billion over the period 1998 -2003 (CBO 1997 . Medicaid DSH reductions represented the major sources of federal BBA Medicaid savings, specifically accounting for 61% of total Medicaid gross savings over five years. After the BBA, Congress passed the Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) in 1999. This law eliminated the BBA DSH cuts for federal fiscal year (FFY) 2001 and FFY 2002 , and also provided relief by setting 2001 state-specific allotments at 2000 levels, adjusted for inflation, and setting 2002 allotments at 2001 levels, adjusted for inflation. However, the Benefit and Improvement Protection Act (BIPA) of 2000 let the full BBA DSH reductions become effective in FFY 2003 (Mechanic 2004) .
Our study examines how changes in Medicaid DSH payments resulting from the BBA affected hospital provision of uncompensated care in California. California is a state with a high rate of uninsured individuals, and thus historically received relatively large amounts of Medicaid DSH payments. Califorina was also substantially affected by the BBA, with its state-specific federal Medicaid DSH allotment declining from $1,085 million in 1998 to $890 million in 2003 (Federal Register 2004) . We expand existing knowledge about the effects of payment policy on hospital care provided to uninsured patients. In addition, we consider policy factors other than Medicaid DSH that may affect hospital provision of uncompensated care. The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) calls for much of existing Medicaid and Medicare DSH funding to be redirected to subsidize individual health insurance purchase to expand coverage nationally (CMS 2010; Kaiser 2010a Kaiser , 2010b Katz 2010) . Insights derived about the effects of past payment policy changes can provide a better understanding of the potential effects of these future policy changes on the health system.
Literature Review
Several studies have examined the effect of changes in different public payment policy on hospital uncompensated care provision. For example, Sheingold and Buchberger (1986) and Campell and Ahern (1993) examined changes in hospital uncompensated care provision in response to the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) and concluded that the new payment system affected hospital resources available to provide uncompensated care. Regarding state policy reform, Thorpe and Phelps (1991) found that increased uncompensated care payment rates in New York state were positively associated with hospital uncompensated care provision. Dunn and Chen (1994) did not find evidence of a relationship between New Jersey's state diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) reimbursement reform and hospital uncompensated care, but Gaskin (1997) found that hospital uncompensated care provision was positively affected by the initiation of the New Jersey Uncompensated Care Trust Fund.
In relation to Medicaid DSH payments, Lo Sasso and Seamster (2007) investigated the effect of changes in statewide Medicaid DSH spending on uncompensated care between 1990 and 2000, but did not find a relationship between the two. Davidoff et al. (2000) examined the effect of changing state Medicaid payment generosity, which in part reflected increased DSH payments to hospitals, on provision of hospital uncompensated care, and found a positive association between these measures for nonprofit hospitals. Bazzoli et al. (2006) studied the effects of declining Medicaid payment resulting from the BBA of 1997 and found that core safety-net hospitals reduced their uncompensated care in response to this financial pressure.
There are several gaps among these existing studies, which are relevant to our study. First, the unit of analysis in Lo Sasso and Seamster (2007) is the state, and so it is unclear how individual hospitals responded to payment changes. Second, although Davidoff et al. (2000) and Bazzoli et al. (2006) looked at Medicaid measures that in part reflected DSH payments, neither explicitly measured DSH payment changes in their analysis. Thus, the specific effect of changing Medicaid DSH payments on hospital uncompensated care is unclear. Our study addresses these gaps.
Conceptual Framework
In modeling private hospital decisions about the provision of uncompensated care, researchers have typically examined nonprofit and for-profit hospitals separately. In relation to nonprofit hospitals, Frank and Salkever (1991) assumed a nonprofit hospital's utility function depends on net revenues and the level of unmet need for indigent care in the community subject to a financial break-even constraint. Their model suggests that a decline in hospital net revenues resulting from exogenous price reductions (holding total need for indigent care constant) would lead nonprofit hospitals to decrease uncompensated care for indigent patients. Specifically, if Medicaid DSH subsidies declined after the BBA, nonprofit hospitals would adjust their activities to satisfy their breakeven constraints. They might substitute care for other types of patients and thus reduce care for low-income patients (i.e., the substitution effect). Additionally, due to the reduction in DSH subsidies, hospitals might receive fewer financial resources to offset costs of care for low-income patients (i.e., the income effect). Given this, we hypothesize that: H1: Nonprofit hospitals will reduce their uncompensated care provision in response to Medicaid DSH payment reductions, all other things being equal.
For-profit hospitals are assumed to maximize their profits and undertake uncompensated care as a means to satisfy expectations about the role of hospitals in the community. Banks, Paterson, and Wendel (1997) developed a theoretical model to explain uncompensated care provision among for-profit hospitals. They noted that for-profit hospitals are subject to community expectations of providing some indigent care and may incur costs if they do not meet these expectations. A number of mechanisms through which forprofit hospitals would incur these costs exist, including certificate-of-need restrictions and other regulatory sanctions (Davidoff et al. 2000) . When net revenue per paying patient declines, for-profit hospitals may find that the cost of meeting community expectations, in terms of foregone profit, is lower, and thus they increase uncompensated care provision (Banks, Paterson, and Wendel 1997; Bazzoli et al. 2006; Davidoff et al. 2000) .
Although researchers have explored forprofit hospitals' reaction to payment changes for paying patients (i.e., Medicare or commercially insured patients) in determining the provision of uncompensated care, they have not considered for-profit hospitals' response to declining Medicaid DSH payments (Banks, Paterson, and Wendel 1997; Bazzoli et al. 2006; Davidoff et al. 2000) . Extending the logic of Banks, Paterson, and Wendel (1997) , we argue that for-profit hospitals will reduce uncompensated care provision as Medicaid DSH declines. Specifically, we conceptualize for-profit hospitals as using Medicaid DSH payments to offset the costs of uncompensated care. When DSH payments decline, forprofit hospitals experience higher residual costs that they must absorb to maintain the same level of uncompensated care, and this in turn will lower their profits, ceteris paribus. Given this, we expect for-profit hospitals to reduce their supply of uncompensated care in the face of declining DSH payments. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H2: For-profit hospitals will reduce their uncompensated care provision in response to Medicaid DSH payment reductions, all other things being equal.
Methodology

Data and Sample
We studied longitudinal data for California hospitals from 1996 to 2003. Study data were drawn from several databases. First, we used annual hospital financial data from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) in California. This data set includes state audited financial statements for all California hospitals. Second, we used hospital structural data from the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey. Third, from the Area Resource File (ARF), we gleaned extensive information on commu-nity demographics, and socioeconomic attributes at the county level. Fourth, HealthLeaders-InterStudy provided data on health maintenance organization (HMO) enrollment at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level. Fifth, Medi-Cal annual statistical reports provided statistical data on the average number of Medi-Cal eligible individuals per month at the county level. Sixth, Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports provided information about Medicaid managed care programs. And seventh, from the Medicare hospital cost reports we got data on hospital Medicare DSH payments.
We included all short-term, nonfederal general acute care hospitals in California. Kaiser hospitals, which constitute 25 hospitals in each study year, were excluded because they do not report data to the state. In addition, we excluded California hospitals that experienced ownership changes (i.e., hospital closure or ownership conversion) during the study years because these changes could affect hospital charity care missions and the provision of uncompensated care. About 8% of hospitals were excluded due to this restriction. There were a total of 2,287 hospital-year observations in California, representing 318 hospitals that reported data at least one year. California hospitals that provide a high volume of care to low-income and uninsured patients are eligible to receive Medicaid DSH payments and were defined as DSH hospitals. Between 1996 and 2003, 130 hospitals received Medicaid DSH payments in one or more years, and about 52% of those hospitals received Medicaid DSH continuously for more than six years.
Variable Definition
Hospital uncompensated care provision. We measured hospital uncompensated care provision as total uncompensated care charges divided by a hospital's average charge per admission, which then was divided by the number of hospital beds. We called this variable ''uncompensated care admissions per bed''; it is similar to the variable developed by Banks, Paterson, and Wendel (1997) , Gaskin (1997) , and Hsieh, Clement, and Bazzoli (2010) . By standardizing this measure relative to hospital admissions and hospital beds, we can compare the provision of uncompensated care across different-sized hospitals and multiple years.
Medicaid DSH payments. Many researchers have noted that the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital payment program is a complicated financing system (Coughlin et al. 1994; Coughlin and Liska 1997; Mechanic 2004) . It is necessary to know how the financing mechanism works in order to construct accurate measures of the Medicaid DSH payments that individual hospitals received.
The majority of state governments use intergovernmental transfers to generate matching federal funds for DSH payments. In the California Medicaid DSH program (also called the SB855 DSH program), the state collects funds through intergovernmental transfers (IGTs) from public hospitals. Then, the federal government matches the state's funds at the California federal Medicaid matching rate of 51.55%. After that, the state retains a portion of the combined funds in the state general fund and distributes the other portion of the combined funds to both public and private hospitals (Coughlin et al. 1994; Coughlin and Liska 1997; McCue and Draper 2004; Mechanic 2004) . A hospital is eligible for a Medicaid DSH payment when it meets one of the two criteria: 1) the hospital's number of Medi-Cal inpatient days must be at least one standard deviation above the statewide mean; 2) the hospital's revenues from lowincome patient utilization (including Medi-Cal and uncompensated care) must account for 25% or more of its total revenues (Fonkych and Melnick 2010) . McCue and Draper (2004) and Baicker and Staiger (2005) have argued that the Medicaid DSH payments received by public hospitals should be reduced by the portion of intergovernmental transfers used to obtain matching federal funds. Thus, it is necessary to calculate net Medicaid DSH as the amount of Medicaid DSH payments that a hospital received less the amount of funds collected by the state through IGTs. Similar to uncompensated care provision, we rescaled the net Medicaid DSH payment divided by the hospital's average charge per admission and then divided by the number of hospital beds. In this way, we can have the same scale between uncompensated care admissions per bed and the net Medicaid DSH variable.
Other governmental subsidies. To assess the impact of the decline in Medicaid DSH payments on uncompensated care, it is important to control for other governmental subsidies that hospitals receive to offset the unreimbursed costs of care for Medicaid and uninsured patients. Specifically, a change in Medicaid DSH, even if it looks large, may not have much effect because Medicaid DSH may be relatively small in magnitude relative to other financial support received by the hospital.
The variable ''other governmental subsidies'' consisted of two components. The first was the state and local governmental subsidies, which national studies indicate covered approximately 31% of total uncompensated care costs in 2001 and 2008 (Hadley and Holahan 2003; Hadley et al. 2008 (Hadley and Holahan 2003; Hadley et al. 2008) . The amount of Medicare DSH that a hospital received was determined by the proportion of all Medicare days attributable to beneficiaries of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the proportion of all patient days for which Medicaid was the primary payer. We measured other governmental support as the sum of state and county tax appropriations, restricted donations and subsidies for indigent care, subsidies for district hospitals, and Medicare DSH payments. This sum was divided by the hospital's average charge per admission and then divided by the number of hospital beds so that the scaling for the variable was the same as the uncompensated care dependent variable.
Market characteristics. Several market factors were also controlled. We used data from 1996-2003 Medi-Cal Annual Statistical Reports to construct a Medicaid eligibility variable as the ratio of the number of average monthly Medi-Cal eligible individuals to the total population at the county level. 4 We measured Medicaid managed care as the ratio of the number of Medicaid managed care enrollees to the total population at the county level. This latter variable was based on 1996-2003 Medi-Cal Managed Care Annual Statistical Reports. 5 A Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was calculated on the basis of hospital admissions to measure market competition at the county level. In calculating the HHI, hospital admissions for those hospitals in the same multi-hospital system within a county were combined and treated as if the system were one organization. The prevalence of public hospital beds in a county was measured as the percentage of county and district hospital beds out of total hospital beds. Likewise, the presence of teaching hospitals was measured as the percentage of teaching hospital beds to total hospital beds within the county. These two variables were included because public hospitals have obligations locally to provide a broad range of care for all types of patients and teaching hospitals may need to provide a full range of services to train new physicians. Thus, hospitals located in a community with relatively more public hospital or teaching hospital beds may have less need to provide unprofitable services (Bazzoli et al. 2006; Davidoff et al. 2000) .
The final market measures were related to demand for uncompensated care. Ideally, it is best to measure uninsured demand by using the number of uninsured and low-income individuals in the county. However, no publicly available data allow measuring this variable over time. 6 Therefore, we used the median household income and unemployment rate for each county as proxy variables to capture uninsured demand. These demographic data came from the Area Resource File for the years 1996 to 2003.
Hospital characteristics. Several hospital characteristics were also included. Hospital ownership type consists of three dummy variables to identify for-profit hospitals, county hospitals, and district hospitals (nonprofit hospital is the omitted category). Ownership data are from OSHPD hospital annual financial data. We included a system affiliation variable that identified whether a hospital is a member of a multi-hospital system. One dummy variable is used to identify hospital teaching status. Hospital nurse labor force was measured as the sum of the number of full time equivalent (FTE) registered nurses, divided by total staffed hospital beds. Medicare share of inpatient days was also used as a control variable. These hospital characteristics were constructed from the AHA annual survey. Additionally, annual dummy variables were included to identify the study years.
Empirical Model
Equation 1 presents the basic reduced form empirical model:
where i is an individual hospital; t equals year; UC it is the provision of hospital uncompensated care for hospital i in year t; DSH it represents net Medicaid DSH payments; Z it is a variable for other governmental financial support for indigent care (including Medicare DSH and state and local governmental supports). M it is a vector of market characteristics. H it is a vector of hospital characteristics, including teaching status, multi-hospital system status, and Medicare share. These variables can vary from year to year because hospitals may change their involvement in teaching new physicians, may be acquired or dropped by multi-hospital systems, and may experience fluctuations in the number of Medicare patients they treat. Yr represents year dummy variable; FP it is a dummy variable for forprofit hospital; CNTY it is a dummy variable for county hospitals; and DISTRIC it is a dummy variable for district hospitals (nonprofit hospitals are the omitted category). Because we are interested in the effect of Medicaid DSH payments (DSH it ) among different ownerships, we interacted ownership dummy variables and DSH payment (DSH it ) in the model. t i is a hospital-specific error component, and u it is a random error term.
This empirical model allows us to test study hypotheses 1 and 2. The coefficient estimate for DSH (i.e., d 1 ) captures the effect of changes in Medicaid DSH payments on nonprofit hospital provision of uncompensated care. We expect the coefficient signs to be positive and significant because nonprofit hospitals may reduce the provision of uncompensated care provided to low-income patients in response to reductions in Medicaid DSH payment. In addition, as proposed in hypothesis 2, for-profit hospitals may reduce uncompensated care provision when Medicaid DSH payments decline. Thus, the total effect of DSH payments for for-profit hospitals, which is the sum of the coefficients d 1 and d 5 , is expected to be positive.
Analytical Strategy
Our estimation approach takes advantage of an eight-year panel to control for unobserved time-invariant hospital and market characteristics. The empirical model was estimated with a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach and a first-differencing transformation. We used two-stage least squares because there is a potential ''feedback effect'' or ''sequential exogeneity'' between hospital uncompensated care provision and Medicaid DSH payment. Specifically, the Medicaid DSH payment that a hospital receives in time t depends on low-income patient utilization lagged one year. We used a first-differencing transformation to both remove the hospitalspecific error component t i and to correct for arbitrary autocorrelation because this transformation will make a highly persistent time process weakly dependent (Wooldridge 2006: pp. 397-398) . We then used the lagged difference in net Medicaid DSH variable (DDSH i,t-1 ) as an instrumental variable for the first-differenced regressor of Medicaid DSH effect (DDSH i,t ), following the approach described by Wooldridge (2002) . Similarly, we used the lagged-difference variable in the interaction term between ownership (e.g., for-profit binary variable) and net Medicaid DSH variable as an instrumental variable. We also used lagged difference in other governmental subsidies (DZ i,t-1 ) as an instrumental variable for the first-differenced regressor of other governmental support (DZ i,t ).
A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was conducted to test for endogeneity. The results suggested that estimators in the 2SLS model were consistent. In addition, we implemented a first-stage diagnostic test for the relevance of instruments, and obtained a Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic of 11.88, which indicates that the instrumental variable does not appear to be weak.
The use of hospital-specific data could be a source of heteroskedasticity. To account for unequal error variances across hospitals, we used a heteroskedasticity-robust standard error adjustment. Furthermore, we recognized the existence of intra-county variations in county-level indicators for the Medicaid program or demand characteristics and intrahospital variations in Medicaid DSH payments that could bias downward estimated standard errors (Davidoff et al. 2000) . As such, the estimated variance-covariance matrix for estimated coefficients was adjusted with the Huber-White correction by using a two-way clustering approach developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006 In contrast to the trend of increased annual uncompensated care admissions per bed, we observed decreased net Medicaid DSH financial support when measured relative to admissions and hospital beds among DSH hospitals. The mean value of net Medicaid DSH (scaled) trended downward beginning in 1999, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on study variables. These statistics combine data across eight years from 1996 to 2003 for DSH hospitals, non-DSH hospitals, and hospitals overall. Among hospitals that received Medicaid DSH payments in any of the study years, about 12% were district hospitals, 21% were county hospitals, 37% were nonprofit hospitals and 30% were for-profit hospitals. The data also suggest that hospitals receiving Medicaid DSH payments tended to receive greater amounts of other types of governmental financial support (p,.01), to have larger bed size (p,.01), and to be more involved in teaching than hospitals not receiving DSH (p,.01). DSH hospitals also tend to be located in counties with lower household income (p ,.01), a greater unemployment rate (p,.01), higher ratios of Medicaid eligible to total population (p ,.01), higher Medicaid managed care enrollees to total population (p,.01), and a greater presence of public (p,.01) and teaching hospitals (p,.01). Table 3 reports the detailed results from the 2SLS with first-differencing estimation. Based on the results in Table 3 , we further calculated Medicaid DSH total effects on hospitals by ownership types as presented in Table 4 . Looking first at the net Medicaid DSH (scaled) variable in Table 3 , the coefficient reflects the impact of these payments on the behavior of nonprofit hospitals, a positive and significant association (p,.01) was found between net Medicaid DSH payments and hospital uncompensated care admissions per hospital bed. These results suggest that nonprofit hospitals significantly reduced their uncompensated care provision when reductions in Medicaid DSH payments occurred during the study years. Other things being equal, the marginal effect of the net Medicaid DSH (scaled) variable indicates that a oneunit decrease in the amount of DSH payment is associated with decreased uncompensated care admissions per hospital bed by .944 (p,.01) by nonprofit hospitals, which sup-ports our hypothesis H1. To examine hypothesis 2, we summed the main coefficient for DSH in the model plus its interaction with hospital for-profit status as shown in Table 4 . The total effect of a one-unit change in the Medicaid DSH variable for for-profit hospitals was not significant, suggesting that forprofit hospitals did not substantially change uncompensated care provision as DSH declined. We further examined the Medicaid DSH total effects on uncompensated care provision among county and district hospitals. The coefficients did not show significant effects. This may be because county and district DSH hospitals had other sources of support to offset their uncompensated care costs or because the number of these facilities in our sample was small and thus power may have been an issue.
In addition, the findings indicate that hospitals located in markets with growing HMO market penetration (p,.05) and growing market concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (p,.1) had de-clining uncompensated care admissions per hospital beds. With respect to other hospital characteristics, the results indicate that hospitals that had increasing numbers of nurse staffing to bed provided more uncompensated care (p,.01). Hospitals that became affiliated with a multi-hospital system experienced a reduction in uncompensated care (p,.1). Hospitals that became teaching hospitals significantly increased their annual uncompensated care admissions per hospital bed (p,.01).
As with any study, several limitations of the analysis must be acknowledged. First, due to the lack of comparable data on key study variables in other states, we only examined hospitals in California. The results may not be generalizable to other states. Second, to capture the specific impact of Medicaid DSH payment cuts resulting from the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, we conducted a pre-andpost design that covered the study period between 1996 and 2003. However, other policy reforms (i.e., the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which was effective in 1995) that capped the expansion of Medicaid DSH expenditures may have had some residual historical effects on hospital outcomes for early study years (i.e., 1996 and 1997) (see endnote 2). Third, our analytical approach distinguished between hospitals receiving DSH and those that did not, with the assumption that the former are primary providers of hospital safety-net care in a community. Although several researchers have defined safety-net hospitals using criteria similar to that used in California to identify DSH recipients (Bazzoli et al. 2012; Dorn and Buettgens 2010; Gaskin, Hadley, and Freeman 2001; Hadley and Cunningham 2004) , we recognize that this approach may not correctly identify all safety-net institutions serving a community. Fourth, our analysis excluded hospitals that closed during the study period; if DSH payments reductions were a primary factor in these closures, we may be underestimating the effects of DSH reductions on uncompensated care. Fifth, following the work of Newhouse (1970), Frank and Salkever (1991) , and Hoerger (1991) , we assumed that a hospital funds care that is uncompensated in time period t with the pool of resources available to it in time period t. To some degree, however, current provision of uncompensated care may be affected by consideration of what future DSH resources a hospital will derive, especially for those hospitals that perceive they are near the threshold for receiving DSH in a subsequent year, based on the California criteria for DSH determination. This is an important consideration that might best be explored in future research using a mixed method qualitative and empirical approach.
Summary and Discussion
In response to the growing number of people without insurance, policymakers have sought to reduce the number of uninsured individuals by either expanding public insurance coverage or subsidizing the cost of uncompensated care for health care providers (Weissman 2005). Medicaid DSH payments are among the major funds that traditionally have supported health care providers, offsetting a large portion of their costs for providing care to uninsured patients. However, these financial subsidies were reduced as a result of the BBA of 1997. As Figure 1 shows for California hospitals, there was a growing trend of uncompensated care among DSH hospitals between 1996 and 2003. However, the financial support from Medicaid DSH payments declined over the years and the gap between this support and the hospital financial burden for uncompensated care has become larger. Hospital industry leaders and policymakers have concerns that hospitals may reduce medical care provided to uninsured patients when faced with reductions in Medicaid DSH payments. To address this, we examined the association between changes in Medicaid DSH payments resulting from the BBA and the provision of hospital uncompensated care. This study applied economic theory of hospital behavior as a framework to examine the association between the hospital provision of uncompensated care and Medicaid DSH payments. As already noted, we examined data for California hospitals from 1996 to 2003. Findings suggest that nonprofit hospitals reduced their provision of uncompensated care in response to reductions in Medicaid DSH payments. To put the magnitude of these responses into perspective, it is worthwhile to examine the elasticity of hospital responses, namely the percentage change in uncompensated care provision associated with a percentage change in the net Medicaid DSH variable. We calculated these using mean values for nonprofit hospitals and the marginal effect estimates based on the results in Table 4 . For nonprofit hospitals, our study findings imply that a one-unit change in the scaled net Medicaid DSH variable equaled 32.9% reduction in net Medicaid DSH (i.e., 1 divided by 3.04) and this was associated with a 15.47% (i.e., 1 divided by 6.1 and then multiplied by .944) decline in hospital uncompensated care. This implies that the elasticity of uncompensated care provision to a net Medicaid DSH change was .47. 8 Overall, for nonprofit hospitals, these results suggest an inelastic but still sizable response to declining Medicaid DSH payments.
The 2010 U.S. health care reform law-the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Actintends to redirect a substantial amount of Medicaid DSH payments to provide subsidies to aid individual purchase of health insurance (Berenson et al. 2009; Hall 2011; Katz 2010) . Existing evidence from the state of Massachusetts, which implemented health reform similar to the ACA, suggests that safety-net hospitals continue to serve an important role in providing care for the uninsured and underinsured, and in fact, that patients' demand for care at these institutions remains strong. For example, the National Association of Public Hospitals (2009) reported that the two safety-net hospital systems in Massachusetts cared for a growing number of low-income individuals after statewide health reform was implemented, with the majority of the increase attributable to Medicaid patients. Ku et al. (2011) also found that the demand for care at safety-net facilities that occurred with health care reform has continued to rise in Massachusetts. In light of this, federal and state officials need to carefully monitor how care for the residual uninsured changes after national health reform is implemented. They also must consider whether residual DSH funding is appropriately directed to those facilities providing the bulk of this care so the financial condition of these hospitals is not adversely affected and they can continue to provide needed access to services for the remaining uninsured population and the growing number of underinsured people. 7 Stata SE 11.0 version was used and ivreg2 function was primarily used for the analysis. 8 As noted in the text, the elasticity of response equals the percentage change in uncompensated care admissions per bed divided by the percentage change in net Medicaid DSH (scaled). We used nonprofit hospitals' mean value of uncompensated care admissions per bed and net Medicaid DSH (scaled) from 1996 to 2003 to calculate these values. The mean value of uncompensated care admissions per bed for nonprofit hospitals was 6.1. The mean value of net Medicaid DSH for nonprofit hospitals was 3.04.
Notes
